The synopsis of the case that gave rise to this appeal is that the Appellant who was at one time a staff of the 1st Respondent, had his appointment first terminated and later dismissed. He filed an action in the High Court seeking the reliefs of (a) declaration that his termination was illegal, unconstitutional and therefore void, (b) an order directing his re-instatement to the position he had hitherto held in the 1st Respondent's corporate body and, (c) and directing that all his cumulative entitlements, salaries, and allowances be paid to him.

The Appellant, a former General Manager of the 1st Respondent received an internal memo on the 16th February, 1998 in what was described as a dereliction of duty. On the 22nd February, 1998 he responded to the memo pointing out the latent problems assailing due performance in the institutional body and dutifully proffered possible solutions. On the 2nd of March 1998 a query was issued to him and this was promptly followed two days later by a suspension, and a committee was set up to investigate the allegations against him. In the same month, indeed to be factual on the 19th of March 1998, he was summoned to appear before the disciplinary committee set up by the 1st Respondent on the authority and approval of the 2nd Respondent. He appeared before the committee on the 20th March, 1998 to answer to the summons. On the 28th of July, 1998 his appointment was terminated by a letter. Technically he ceased to be an employee of the 1st Respondent after the termination. Three days after receiving the letter of termination, he filed an action in the Federal High Court challenging his termination. The 2nd Respondent interestingly as though not to be beaten, by a letter of 21st April 1999 purported to dismiss him from the service of the 1st Respondent. The effect of this no doubt is that the 2nd Respondent under whom the Appellant was not working was issued with the letter of dismissal from the service of the 1st Respondent who had earlier terminated the service of the Appellant who was its servant.

In the High Court, the issue of the jurisdiction having regard to the tenor and intendment of Special Provisions Decree No. 17 of 1984 (now tendered moribund by the Constitution of 1999) was raised. In that Court, the learned trial Judge held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the case and accordingly the action was struck out. The Appellant thereupon appealed to the lower Court and the action was dismissed on the issue of lack of jurisdiction. The Appellant therefore appealed to this Court